An accumulator based on bilinear pairings was proposed at CT-RSA'05. In this paper, we first demonstrate that the security model proposed by Lan Nguyen does lead to a cryptographic accumulator which is not collision resistant. Second we show that we can provide collision-resistance by updating the adversary model appropriately. Finally, we propose an improvement on Nguyen's identity escrow scheme with membership revocation based on the accumulator by removing the trusted third party.
Introduction
A cryptographic accumulator is an algorithm allowing the aggregation of a large set of elements into a single value of constant size. Accumulators were introduced by Belanoh and de Mare [5] in order to design distributed protocols without the presence of a trusted central authority. Such constructions are used in time-stamping [5] , fail-stop signatures [4] , ring signatures [11] and multicast stream authentication [12] for instance. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya introduced the notion of dynamic accumulators which allow the addition and deletion of values from the original set of elements [8] . In 2005, Nguyen [15] proposed a dynamic accumulator based on bilinear pairings to design ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes and identity escrow protocols with membership revocation.
In this work, we demonstrate that, contrary to what was claimed in [15] , Nguyen's accumulator is not collision resistant. Following his advice [17] , we demonstrate how to modify the security model so that collision resistance can be provided. Finally, we prove that it is possible to modify his identity escrow scheme based on the accumulator so that the presence of a trusted third party is not required any longer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall the definitions and results from the original paper by Nguyen [15] . In Section 3, we introduce our attack against the collision resistance of Nguyen's accumulator. In Section 4, we demonstrate that the security model modification proposed by Nguyen [17] does lead to a collision resistant accumulator. Finally, we design our improvement on Nguyen's identity escrow scheme in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the definitions and constructions as they appear in Nguyen's paper [15] .
Notations and Terminology
Definition 1 A function f : N → R + is said to be negligible if:
Definition 2 A function f : N → R + is said to be polynomially bounded if:
We denote Z p the set of residues {0, . . . , p − 1} modulo p. We consider two additive cyclic groups G 1 = P 1 and G 2 = P 2 as well as a cyclic multiplicative group G M . These three groups are assumed to have the same prime order p.
We assume that we have a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G M such that:
1. ∀(P, Q) ∈ G 1 × G 2 ∀(a, b) ∈ Z p × Z p e(a P, b Q) = e(P, Q) a b
2. e(·, ·) is not degenerated: e(P 1 , P 2 ) = 1
3. There exists a computationally efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for every couple (P, Q) from
As in [15] , we consider G 1 = G 2 (and thus P 1 = P 2 ) in the remainder of this paper. We have the following definition:
Definition 3 A bilinear pairing instance generator is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm G taking as input a security parameter 1 ℓ and returning a uniformly random tuple t = (p, G 1 , G M , e(·, ·), P ) of bilinear pairing parameters defined as before where ℓ represents the length of the prime number p and G 1 = P .
We now present the definition of accumulators and the collision resistance property as set by Nguyen in [15] .
Definition 4 ([15])
An accumulator is a tuple ({X ℓ } ℓ∈N , {F ℓ } ℓ∈N ), where {X ℓ } ℓ∈N is called the value domain of the accumulator and {F ℓ } ℓ∈N is a sequence of pairs of functions such that each (f, g) ∈ F ℓ is defined as f :
In addition, the following properties are satisfied:
• (Efficient Generation) There exists an efficient algorithm G taking as input a security parameter 1 ℓ and outputting a random element (f, g) from F ℓ possibly together with some auxiliary information a f .
•
does not depend on the order of the elements to be evaluated and is denoted f (u, X).
• (Efficient Evaluation) For any (f, g) ∈ F ℓ , u ∈ U f and X ⊂ X ℓ with polynomially bounded size (as a function of ℓ), g(f (u, X)) is computable in time polynomial in ℓ even without the knowledge of a f .
Nguyen set the previous definition to generalize the accumulator constructions by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8] and Dodis et al. [11] where U f = U g and the bijective function g is the identity function. Then, he gave the following security definition.
Definition 5 ([15] Collision Resistant Accumulator)
An accumulator is said to be collision resistant if for every PPT algorithm A, the function:
is negligible as a function of ℓ. We say that w is a witness for the fact that x ∈ X ℓ has been accumulated in v ∈ U g whenever g(f (g −1 (w), x)) = v.
We now introduce the q-Strong Diffie Hellman (q-SDH) assumption as it was used by Nguyen to claim the security of his construction.
Definition 6
The q-Strong Diffie Hellman (q-SDH) assumption states that for every PPT algorithm A, the function:
is negligible as a function of ℓ where t = (p,
Construction of the Accumulator
To generate an instance of the accumulator from the security parameter ℓ, we run the algorithm G on input 1 ℓ to obtain a tuple t and a uniformly chosen element s from Z * p as in Definition 6. We construct a tuple t ′ := (P, s P, . . . , s q P ) where q is an upper bound on the number of elements to be accumulated. The corresponding functions (f, g) for this instance (t, t ′ ) are defined as:
This construction involves that we have:
It is clear that f is quasi-commutative. In addition, for u ∈ Z p and a set X = {x 1 , . . . , 
Breaking the Collision Resistance
In this section, we construct a PPT algorithm A which breaks the collision resistance property of the accumulator with non-negligible probability. Since this will contradict the result from Theorem 1, we will then show that the adversary reduction model to the q-SDH assumption given by Nguyen was incorrect.
Our Attack
Algorithm Construction. According to Definition 5, the adversary is given the functions f and g as well as u and the set U f = Z p . We build the following algorithm:
The pair of functions (f, g) and the value u. 1. Compute s = f (1, 0) 2. Let k be any polynomial function of ℓ. Choose uniformly at random k + 1 elements of Z p \ {−s} denoted x 1 , . . . , x k , x and set X := {x 1 , . . . , x k }.
Compute
(x i + s) u mod p and µ := (x + s) −1 mod p. Denote ξ := λ µ mod p and set w := g(ξ).
Output: The triple (x, w, X).
Correctness of the output. Due to
Step 2, we have:
Step 3, we obtain: w ∈ U g .
By construction of X we have:
We obtain the following equalities:
Therefore, we have:
In addition, the construction of the triple (x, w, X) is deterministic (the value µ always exists since x = −s). So, we obtain:
Running time. First, it should be noticed that any operation (addition, multiplication, inversion) in Z p can be done in quadratic time as a function of ℓ [14] . That is, any of these arithmetic operations can be performed in O(ℓ 2 ) bit operations.
Since k is a polynomial function of ℓ, we denote it as K(ℓ). We can also assume that picking one random element from Z p \ {−s} requires polynomial time R(ℓ) (otherwise it would be computationally infeasible to construct a single family of elements from Z p \ {−s} = X ℓ which is not a realistic assumption). Thus, Step 2 is executed in (K(ℓ) + 1) R(ℓ) bit operations.
Since s has been obtained at Step 1 (using O(ℓ 2 ) bit operations), one can get λ with k multiplications and k additions in
2 ) bit operations. Each of the two elements, µ and ξ, also needs O(ℓ 2 ) bit operations to be computed while g can be run in polynomial time G(ℓ). Therefore, the number of bit operations executed during Step 3 is
As a consequence, the running time of A is:
which is polynomial in the security parameter ℓ.
Therefore, A is a PPT algorithm breaking the collision resistance of the accumulator with non-negligible probability. Thus, the accumulator is not collision resistant. We point out that A enables to construct many such triples (x, w, X).
Comments on the Original Security Proof
The issue in [15] is that the adversary is given access to f which enables him to break the computational assumption as follows. According to Definition 6, an adversary trying to break the q-SDH assumption should only be provided with (t, P, z P, . . . , z q P ). Nevertheless, the adversary model of the accumulator (Definition 5) allows to query both f and g. As a consequence, it is easy for the adversary to obtain z by a single query to f as in Step 1 of A. Then, he can compute
bit operations for any c. Finally, the adversary runs g on that inverse and obtain 1 z+c P . This means that the adversary can break the q-SDH assumption.
Ensuring Collision Resistance
In order to be immune against our attack, Nguyen suggested to allow the adversary the use of the composition g •f instead of both f and g [16, 17] . His proposed definition is as follows:
Definition 7 ([16])
In [15] , the issue was that a PPT adversary A col.acc. attacking the collision resistance of the accumulator had extra information (namely, a direct access to both f and g) with respect to a PPT adversary A q-SDH trying to attack the q-SDH assumption directly. We now demonstrate that it is not the case any longer for the security model based on Definition 7.
Theorem 2 Let A col.acc. be a PPT adversary attacking the collision resistance of the accumulator and let A q-SDH be a PPT adversary attacking the q-SDH assumption. Then, both adversaries have the same view of the q-SDH assumption.
Proof. According to Definition 6, a PPT adversary A q-SDH attempting to break the q-SDH assumption is given the elements t and t ′ where:
According to Definition 7, a PPT adversary A col.acc. attempting to break the collision resistance of the accumulator is provided with t (representing the construction parameters of the accumulator) as well as t ′′ where:
In the case of Nguyen's construction, we have: U f = Z p . So, we can write:
We have to demonstrate that A col.acc. (initially attacking the collision resistance of the accumulator) does not gain any benefits from receiving t ′ (i.e. A col.acc. knows t, t ′ and t ′′ ) over A q-SDH who attacks the q-SDH assumption directly (i.e. A q-SDH only knows t and t ′ ). In other words, we must prove that the extra knowledge t ′′ does not give A col.acc. any advantage with respect to A q-SDH when attacking the q-SDH assumption.
First, it should be noticed that A q-SDH knows the group Z p (second component of t ′ ) since he has knowledge of p as a part of the parameter t.
Second, A q-SDH can simulate the black-box g • f from t and t ′ . Indeed consider (U, X ) from Z p × Z p . We have:
Since (P, s P ) are the first two elements of t ′ , A q-SDH can compute (g • f )(U, X ) in polynomial time for any input (U, X ).
It remains to argue about the role of u. Assume that A col.acc. designs an oracle O(t, t ′ , t ′′ ). The previous two observations allows us to rewrite this oracle as O(t, t ′ , u). According to Definition 7, u has been chosen uniformly at random from Z p and then given to A col.acc. . Nevertheless, Z p is also known to A q-SDH . Thus, A q-SDH can also draw elements uniformly at random from Z p . As a consequence, the advantage of the algorithm O(t, t ′ , u) is equal to the advantage of the algorithm O(t, t ′ , v) where v has been chosen uniformly at random from Z p by A q-SDH .
Thus, the view of A col.acc. (when he is given t ′ ) is identical to the view of A q-SDH .
The previous results shows that A q-SDH can simulate the result of any algorithm A col.acc. can design (since A q-SDH can directly construct g • f while u is chosen uniformly at random over the set Z p which is also known to A q-SDH ). We can now demonstrate the security of Nguyen's accumulator similarly to [15] .
Theorem 3 If the q-SDH assumption holds then the accumulator is collision resistant.
Proof. Assume that a PPT adversary A can break the collision resistance of the accumulator with non-negligible probability. As stated in [15] , A can construct a set X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } ⊂ Z p \ {−z}, an element x ∈ Z p \ (X ∪ {−z}) and W ∈ G 1 such that:
where the tuple challenge for the q-SDH assumption is (P, z P, . . . , z q P ). We will show that the PPT adversary A can compute (x, 1 x+z P ) with non-negligible probability.
Consider the formal polynomial f (Z) defined as:
The (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix is invertible. Since the coefficients f 0 , . . . , f k−1 only depend on x 1 , . . . , x k , the adversary can compute the value c as well as the coefficients of g(Z). We have:
Since k ≤ q, the elements P, z P, . . . , z k P are public. Therefore, the adversary can compute g(z) P since:
which achieves the proof of construction of 1 x+z P . As a consequence, the PPT adversary A was able to compute (x, 1 x+z P ) with non-negligible probability which means that A broke the q-SDH assumption.
Improvement to Nguyen's Identity Escrow Scheme
In 1991, Chaum and van Heyst introduced group signatures to enable individual members to sign messages on behalf of the whole group [10] . An identity escrow scheme [13] is actually an interactive version of a group signature scheme. We propose an improvement on the modified version of Nguyen's construction as the original scheme was found flawed by Zhang and Chen [19] . Our proposed construction does not require the presence of a trusted third party while keeping the efficiency of the original scheme.
Design of Nguyen's Identity Escrow Scheme
An identity escrow scheme with membership revocation is a tuple IE = (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, IEID P , IEID V , Open, Judge, Revoke, Update, CheckArchive) of polynomial time algorithms, where GKg generates public parameters and secret keys, UKg generates personal public and private keys for users (candidate members), the protocol (Join, Iss) allows a user to join the group and get a membership secret key and a membership certificate, where Join represent the part run by the user, Iss the part run by the Group Manager (GM) issuing certificates. The identity escrow's main protocol IEID = (IEID P , IEID V ) allows a group member to anonymously prove his membership, Open revokes an IEID transcript to find the prover and Judge decides if the Open finds the right prover. The details of the notations are referred to [15] .
This identity escrow scheme works as follows. Denote ℓ the security value. The construction parameters of the scheme (p, G 1 , G M , e(·, ·), P ) are obtained by querying the bilinear pairing instance generator G on input 1 ℓ (Definition 3). We also require the existence of a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p [18] . The details can be found in [15] .
GKg. A trusted third party uniformly chooses x, s, x ′ from Z * p and P 0 , G, H from G 1 . He computes P pub := x P, Θ := e(G, G)
x ′ and Q pub := s Q. He publishes the group public key as {P, P 0 , P pub , H, G, Θ, Q pub }, and gives the GM the issuing key (x, s) as well as the opening key x ′ .
(Join, Iss). When a user U i wants to join the group, he runs an interactive protocol with the GM to obtain his secret key x i , his identity ∆ i as well as a pair (a i , S i ) called certificate. That is, U i selects his secret key x i and sends a committed value x i P to the GM. The GM calculates S i = 1 x+ai (x i P + P 0 ) and transfers it back to U i . The detailed description is referred to [15] . These four elements satisfy e(a i P + P pub , S i ) = e(P, x i P + P 0 ) and ∆ i = e(P, S i ). Suppose the current group accumulated value is V j−1 . The GM computes the new accumulated value as V j := (a i + s) V j−1 . The witness of U i is W i,j := V j−1 .
(IEID P , IEID V ). User U i computes E := t G and Λ := ∆ i Θ t . Then, he can show knowledge of (a i , S i , x i , W i,j ) such that e(a i P + P pub , S i ) = e(x i P + P 0 , P ) and e(a i Q + Q pub , W i,j ) = e(Q, V j ).
Open. To open an IEID transcript (E, Λ, . . .), the GM computes ∆ i = Λ e(E, G)
−x
′ and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of x ′ so that Θ = e(G, G)
Our Improvement
The properties an identity escrow (group signature) scheme must exhibit are unforgeability, anonymity, unlinkability, traceability, collision resistance and exculpability [1, 9] . The latter means that neither a group member nor the GM can sign any message on the behalf of another group member. At Asiacrypt'06, Cao [9] proposed an attack breaking the exculpability of the Ateniese-Camenisch-Joye-Tsudik's (ACJT) group signature [1] . In his attack, the GM can forge a valid group signature on the behalf of U i (for any i) since the GM can intentionally choose t := log a0 a (see [9] for details). The reader may be aware of a recent reply to Cao by the designers of the ACJT scheme [3] . As they emphasize, the attack by Cao only works when the GM is dishonest and the public parameters not verifiable (which was excluded in their original work [1] ).
Consider the case where the scheme parameters are non-verifiable and the GM is untrusted. To reveal the underlying problem of Cao's attack, let's see another attack on the ACJT scheme as follows. Letê andx be asê := k 1 φ(n) and x := −t −1 + k 2 φ(n) (for an appropriate selection of k 1 , k 2 so thatê ∈ Γ andx ∈ Λ, where Γ and Λ are integer intervals defined in [1] ). Thus, we have Aê i ≡ 1 ≡ ax a 0 mod n where A i represents the identity of user U i . The GM can generate group signatures on behalf of U i using (ê,x).
In [15] , this attack is not possible since the scheme parameters are set up by a trusted third party who distributes them to the GM. Nonetheless, the security analysis there does not consider the behavior of the trusted third party which, as pointed out in [6] , will expose the scheme to unexpected attacks. Intuitively, there may be a simple method to foil such attacks, i.e., to generate public parameters P and P 0 as output of some hash function mapping a binary string to a group element [7] . In this case, however, a security proof of Nguyen's scheme has not been provided. We propose below a simple improvement requiring less calculation than querying such a hash function along with a proof of security. Our idea is to identify user U i by x i P instead of S i , as representing U i by a xi rather than A i in the unpublished version of the ACJT scheme [2] . This approach makes the construction resistant against an attack like Cao's.
(Join, Iss). When a user U i wants to join the group, he runs an interactive protocol with the GM to obtain his secret key x i , his identity ∆ i as well as a pair (a i , S i ) called certificate. These four elements satisfy e(a i P +P pub , S i ) = e(P, x i P +P 0 ) and ∆ i = e(P, x i P ). Suppose the current group accumulated value is V j−1 . The GM computes the new accumulated value as V j := (a i + s) V j−1 . The witness of U i is W i,j := V j−1 .
(IEID P , IEID V ). User U i computes E := t G and Λ := ∆ i Θ t . Then, he can show knowledge of (a i , S i , x i , W i,j ) such that e(a i P + P pub , S i ) = e(x i P + P 0 , P ) and e(a i Q + Q pub , W i,j ) = e(Q, V j ). Formally, this proof of knowledge is as below:
e(P, U s ) ai e(P, H) −rsai e(P pub , U s )e(P pub , H) −rs = e(P, P ) xi e(P 0 , P ),
H is also part of the public key.
Here are the details of the construction. In Step 2 (See Page 14, Section 6.1 of [16] ) do:
(a) IEID P generates r s , r w , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , k 6 , k 7 ∈ R Z p and computes the following:
(f) IEID V verifies if the following equalities are satisfied:
Open. To open an IEID transcript (E, Λ, ...), the GM computes ∆ i = Λ e(E, G)
−x
The security of this proof of knowledge is easy to check given two (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , s 7 , c) and (s 
Lemma 1
Under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G 1 , the above IEID protocol is an honest-verifier perfect zeroknowledge proof of knowledge of (a i , S i , x i , W i,j , t) that E = t G and Λ = e(P, P ) xi Θ t , and e(a i P + P pub , S i ) = e(x i P + P 0 , P ) and e(a i Q + Q pub , W i,j ) = e(Q, V j ).
Proof.
Soundness: The goal is to show that if the protocol accepts with non-negligible probability the proof of knowledge, then a PPT prover must have the knowledge of (a i , S i , x i , W i,j ) satisfying the stated relations, under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G 1 . 
Suppose the protocol accepts for the same commitment
, then the following equations are obtained according to the verification algorithms of the protocol:
e(P, U s ) f1 e(P, H) −f7 e(P pub , H) −f6 e(P, P ) −f2 e(P 0 , P )/e(P pub , U s ) = 1
e(Q, U w ) f1 e(Q, H) −f5 e(Q pub , H) −f4 e(Q, V j )/e(Q pub , U w ) = 1 (8)
From Equation (2) to Equation (9), we get:
From Equations (3), (4), (5) and (6), we obtain:
since G is a generator of G 1 .
From Equation (7), we get:
Applying Equation (11), we obtain:
Similarly, from Equation (8) and Equation (12), we get:
From Equations (10), (13) and (14), it is easy to see that if we set t = −f 3 , 
It is easy to see that the distribution of the simulation is the same as the distribution of the real transcript.
Theorem 4
The above scheme provides non-frameability under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G 1 .
Proof.
The corresponding theorem in [15] states that the original Identity Escrow scheme provides non-frameability if the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G 1 holds and the digital signature scheme (K s , Sign, V er) is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack. In our improvement, we simplify the description by omitting the digital signature scheme, whose purpose is to bind (in a non-repudiable manner) the transcript and the identity ∆ i . We just assume this is the case, i.e., ∆ i = e(P, P ) xi and the transcript are bound together. Then, we proceed to prove that if there is a PPT adversary A breaking non-frameability of the above scheme, we can construct a PPT adversary B breaking the Discrete Logarithm assumption over G 1 .
Suppose B is given a challenge P * = zP randomly chosen from group G 1 = P . The goal of B is to calculate z. B constructs an instance of the above scheme by generating x, s, x ′ ∈ R Z * p and P 0 , G, H ∈ R G 1 ensuring G is also a generator of G 1 . B gives A the group public key {P, P 0 , P pub = x P, H, G, Θ, Q pub = s Q}, the issuing key (x, s) and the opening key x ′ .
B simulates a set of possible users {1, ..., q} where q is the upper bound on the group size. B chooses i * ∈ R {1, ..., q} and provides A access to the following simulated oracles the definitions of which can be found in [16] :
• SndToU(i, M in ). If i = i * , B just plays as an honest user i by executing Join as specified in M in . If i = i * , B simulates the (Join, Iss) protocol so that ∆ i = e(P, P * ).
• WReg, GSig, USK, CrptU, RevokeU, and Witness. B can simulate all these oracles because the knowledge of the secret keys, except the case when USK(i * ) is queried.
If A succeeds with probability ǫ, then the probability that he can impersonate i * is at least ǫ/q. From the soundness of the protocol (Lemma 1), B can extract (a i , S i , x i , W i,j , t) so that E = t G, Λ = e(P, P * )Θ t , e(a i P + P pub , S i ) = e(x i P + P 0 , P ) and e(a i Q + Q pub , W i,j ) = e(Q, V j ), i.e., z = x i .
The security properties with regard to anonymity and traceability, as discussed in [15] , also hold in the above scheme, because the encryption part and the GM's algorithms are identical.
Conclusion
In this work, we first constructed an algorithm breaking the collision resistance of the accumulator as defined in [15] . We showed that the original accumulator security model proposed by Nguyen allowed an adversary to break the q-SDH assumption. Second, we demonstrated that the new security model suggested by Nguyen [17, 16] did not allow the adversary to break the mathematical assumption so that the collision resistance of the accumulator is ensured. Finally, we proved that it possible to remove the trusted third party of Nguyen's identity escrow scheme based on the accumulator while being safe against an attack similar to Cao's. 
